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Business Strategy and Firm Performance: the British Corporate Economy, 1949-1984 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
There has been considerable and ongoing debate about the performance of the British 
economy since 1945. Empirical studies have concentrated on aggregate or industry level 
indicators. Few have examined individual firms’ financial performance. This study takes a 
sample of c.3000 firms in 19 industries and identifies Britain’s best performing companies 
over a period of 35 years. Successful companies are defined as a) those that survive as 
independent entities, b) that outperform peer group average return to capital for that industry, 
and c) that outperform other firms in the economy according to return on capital relative to 
industry average. Results are presented as league tables of success and some tentative 
explanations offered concerning the common strategies of successful firms. A broader 
research agenda for British business history is suggested. 
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 Introduction 
This paper presents the results of a survey into the profitability of the British corporate 
economy in the four decades following the Second World War. Its objective is to present an 
empirically rigorous analysis of the most successful long run performers and at the same time 
aims to discover meaningful trends about the relationships that underpin such success. An 
innovative aspect of the survey is that it uses accounting data to assist in the search for 
systematic aspects of corporate success. 
 There are several reasons why this study is potentially important. Previous surveys 
have concentrated on identifying the largest firms, either at a point in time or via a series of 
cross sectional comparatives.1 Whilst useful for examining the changing structure of corporate 
economies, if the objective is to measure the relative success of companies and the strategies 
pursued by their managers, then size alone does not necessarily equate to success. Growth, for 
example, may be seen as fulfilling the objectives of managerial capitalism but at the expense 
of agency and or transaction costs borne by shareholders or rents borne by customers or 
suppliers.2 Substituting an alternative single measure such as profitability does not necessarily 
reconcile these stakeholder issues. Nonetheless, it provides new perspectives on the 
performance of the corporate economy. Profit, unlike size, is more readily compared through 
time. As a measure of success, profitability does not necessarily rule out the large numbers of 
smaller firms that may represent the more dynamic sectors of the economy. These firms may 
typically include the family firms and networked organisations highlighted as alternatives to 
Chandler’s big business dominated paradigm.3 In analysing profitability, this survey borrows 
methodologies employed by two of the authors elsewhere in their analysis of the Lancashire 
cotton textile industry. These studies have attempted to identify the features of successful 
enterprises and the financial constraints imposed by varying systems of governance.4 Unlike 
the investigations into the Lancashire cotton industry, the present survey aims to explore 
possible relationships between profitability and business strategy beyond the confines of a 
single industry.  
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section there is a 
description of the data set. The methodological problems associated with using accounting 
data in surveys of this kind and the strategies used to overcome them are also discussed. A 
further section discusses the implications of the preliminary results for further research and 
finally some tentative conclusions are drawn. 
 
Data and Data Analysis 
Data for the survey were obtained from the Cambridge University/ DTI Companies Database 
(CDCD).5 The database contains the accounting records of the constituent public limited 
companies (PLCs) for the period 1949 to 1984. It should be stressed at this stage for the 
purposes of subsequent discussion that private firms and hence small family businesses are 
therefore excluded. The average number of companies included is 2219 per year across 25 
industries. Companies enter or leave the database depending on time of incorporation, transfer 
to PLC status, take-over, liquidation etc. The total number of company/years on the database 
is over 66,000.  
For the purposes of this analysis, successful companies are defined as a) those that 
survive as independent entities, b) that outperform peer group average return to capital for 
that industry, and c) that outperform other firms in the economy according to return on capital 
relative to industry average. Accordingly, to be included in the list of companies for further 
analysis, a company had to appear on the CDCD database continuously during the period 
1950-1983.6 This method is appropriate because survival is clearly an attribute of long run 
success, especially in an economy that became characterised by take-over and merger activity 
and also the threat to vulnerable firms posed by the recession of 1980-1. Moreover, the 
sample size became more tractable, reducing to 182 companies. This in itself is a commentary 
on the instability of the British economy during the period. Of 3011 quoted companies trading 
in 1950, only 6% of them were still trading as independent organisations in 1984. For these 
surviving companies, relative success was measured by underlying accounting profitability. 
This was defined as return on capital employed (ROCE) or profit before interest and taxation 
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divided by capital employed. In turn, capital employed is defined as long term liabilities plus 
shareholders equity.  
There are several potential objections to using this approach. The first is that ROCE is 
unrelated to underlying economic profit, or internal rates of return (IRRs). Whether or not 
ROCE reflects economic profit, in performance measurement another problem is that cross 
sectional differentials in ARRs may reflect entry barriers and local monopolies rather than 
superior corporate performance per se. 7 Nonetheless, in the context of business history 
research, the creation of entry barriers may be the consequence of successful 
entrepreneurship. This objection to the use of ROCE is overcome, therefore providing 
linkages between process and performance outcome.  
Some distortion may also arise from the impact of inflation on the revenue streams 
and asset bases that form the numerator and denominator of the ROCE ratio. It was for this 
reason, amongst others, that the debate about declining profit rates in the 1970s proved 
difficult to resolve.8 As far as the current survey is concerned, although historical cost figures 
are used throughout, they are applied uniformly and consistently across the whole sample. 
The selection of accounting policies by management, for example depreciation charges, will 
also lead to divergence from the IRR, especially where asset growth rates differ. There is 
considerable US evidence of systematic cross sectional variation in accounting policies, 
particularly with respect to depreciation.9 For these reasons, there has been a considerable 
debate as to whether ROCE can be relied upon at all.10 
 In view of these problems, reliance on historical cost based ROCE needs to reflect 
several considerations. One is the extent to which ROCE is used by the decision-makers 
whose behaviour is being analysed. ROCE remains, as Whittington suggests, `the rule of 
thumb to which decision-makers cling' partly because whether accurate or not, it remains the 
only practical proxy.11 A second consideration is that much of this literature objects to the use 
of ROCE as a proxy for economic rates of return in competitive equilibrium or under 
conditions of monopoly, 12 neither of which necessarily apply in any or all of the industries 
analysed in the current survey. Also discrepancies caused by the adoption of differing 
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accounting policies tend to even out through time. Thus the likelihood of measurement error 
in ROCE is mitigated as the length of time of measurement increases. 13 
Bearing in mind theoretical objections to the implied relationship between ROCE and 
IRR, for the purposes of empirical work the proxy may be still suitable where certain 
conditions are met. 14 One condition is that in a regression of ROCE and IRR, the cross 
sectional errors are likely to be unsystematic. For a large sample of companies, in different 
industries, across a number of years it is expected that this would be the case. Similar 
arguments apply to the objections that the effects of inflation and variation in accounting 
policies distort the ROCE. Finally, even if ROCE does not proxy accurately for IRR, in 
comparative analysis it is sufficient that the two measures are correlated.  
A final and important methodological issue in the use of these ratios arises from their 
statistical distribution. It is generally believed that ratios such as ROCE have non-normal 
cross sectional distributions.15 Consequently, it is very likely that if a sample of firms is 
compared across several years, at least some of the sample firms will record levels of ROCE 
beyond the range of a normal distribution. If ROCEs are to be compared through time, it is 
likely that some companies will have their averages distorted by the inclusion of large 
positive or negative atypical values.  
To summarise these arguments, theoretical and empirical caveats are more likely to 
apply in cases where ROCEs are used to analyse firm performance in single industries or over 
a limited time horizon. Concerns about systematic distortions to ROCE in terms of accounting 
base or accounting policy are less relevant in studies that use data from a wide cross section 
of 19 industries. As far as possible, potential causes of measurement error, for example 
variation in depreciation policy and growth rates, should be quantified and controlled for in 
the empirical tests. The likely non-normality of the distribution remains an important potential 
problem because outlying observations can have a magnifying impact on the results of 
individual firms.  
 Bearing these methodological issues in mind, particularly the last point, further steps 
were taken to avoid the potential distortions arising from the use of ROCE.  To begin with, 
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average ROCE scores for the years 1950-1983 were computed for the 182 companies that 
traded continually during that period. However, because levels of profitability were likely to 
be industry dependent, relative ROCE scores were also computed. These were calculated by 
subtracting the industry average ROCE for the period from the individual ROCE score for 
each company. The result is hence an excess return (ER) measured against an industry 
average hurdle rate. Industry averages were computed with reference to all the firms in the 
original sample rather than those companies in the reduced sample of survivors. Although this 
provided a ranking of firms according to a generally accepted profitability yardstick, it was 
clear that in crucial cases there were non-normality problems. The Thomson Organisation, 
which was the best performing company at this initial stage, exemplifies the case for further 
analysis. However, it achieved its position as a result of extraordinary returns of 281% in 
1981 and 203% in 1982 and their disproportionate influence on the long run average ROCE. 
A possible strategy in some disciplines for dealing with outlying observations would be to 
normalise the distribution or even remove them from the distribution of returns altogether. 
However, for the business historian such extreme cases represent potentially interesting case 
studies.16 To control for the effects of outlying observations without modification or removal, 
the sample was subjected to a second non-parametric test of performance. For each year, 
commencing in 1950 through to 1983, the companies were ranked according to excess return. 
Each company was allocated a score between 1 and 182 according to its position for that year. 
Ranks were then summed for each company by firm for all years to obtain an aggregate rank 
score. Hence, low scoring companies would be those that consistently outperformed during 
the period. In contrast, a high ER might reflect abnormally strong performance in one or two 
uncharacteristic years. 
 These processes produced two league tables of best performing companies, one 
reflecting performance by rank score and the other by ER. Because they measure different 
aspects of performance, at least in so far as the underlying data is non-normally distributed, 
these were aggregated into one table using a simple average of the positions in the separate 
tables. This also allows for a certain economy of presentation. Table 1 sets out the overall 
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rankings of companies that resulted from this process. The first numerical column shows the 
rank score, that is, the sum of the ranks for all years, followed by another column showing 
aggregate rank achieved as a result. The next column shows the aggregate ER for 1950-1983 
for each company and a further column shows the resulting ranking. The final column takes 
the simple numerical average of the two columns. As the sum of ranks was considered to be 
the stronger of the two tests, ties were resolved with reference to the rank score column. Also, 
because some firms were perhaps good performers but in weak sectors, Table 2 shows the 
best performing firm from each industry sector, using the same data as Table 1. The left-hand 
column refers to the overall position of the company in the data used to construct Table 1. For 
the purposes of the discussion below, the focus is on the best performing companies. Table 1 
therefore shows the overall top 20 and Table 2 shows the top firm in each of the 19 industries 
analysed. Details of all 182 companies, calculated according to the methodology for Table 1, 
are shown in Appendix 1. 
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Table 1: Britain's 20 Best Performing Companies, 1950-1983, Overall Ranking 
 
 
Position Company Industry 
Rank 
Score 
Rank 
Rank 
ER 
Rank 
Comb 
Rank 
1 Ellis & Goldstein Clothing & Footwear 36.382 18 6 24
2 Grattan Warehouses Retail 42.941 25 4 29
3 WOLVERHAMPTON & DUDLEY Drinks 16.324 3 28 31
4 Wagon Ind. Holdings Vehicles 56.882 33 1 34
5 Goldberg and Sons Wholesale 46.706 29 5 34
6 Initial Services Services 46.676 28 7 35
7 Dowty Vehicles 57.206 34 2 36
8 HEINZ (H J) CO Food 9.500 1 35 36
9 Coates Group Chemicals 45.353 27 10 37
10 Telephone Rentals Transport 48.353 30 8 38
11 Matthew Hall and Co Metal Goods 44.029 26 12 38
12 Glaxo Chemicals 49.618 31 11 42
13 BTR Other Manufacturing 40.618 24 20 44
14 BASSETT (GEO) HOLDINGS Food 20.765 6 40 46
15 Macmillan Bloedel Containers Paper 29.676 13 36 49
16 Thomson Organisation Paper 64.559 47 3 50
17 FH Tomkins Metal Goods 61.559 37 13 50
18 Tesco Retail 62.412 39 14 53
19 JH Fenner & Co Engineering 52.353 32 22 54
20 Smith and Nephew Textiles 62.559 40 15 55
 
        
 
 
 
 
Notes: Companies are shown in order of lowest combined rank. Ties are resolved with 
reference to rank scores. 
 
Sources: Calculated from CDCD data. 
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Table 2: Britain's Best Performing Companies by Industry Sector, 1950-1983 
 
 
Overall 
Position Company Industry 
Rank 
Score 
Rank 
Rank 
ER 
Rank 
Comb 
Rank 
1 Ellis & Goldstein Clothing & Footwear 36.382 18 6 24
2 Grattan Warehouses Retail 42.941 25 4 29
3 WOLVERHAMPTON & DUDLEY Drinks 16.324 3 28 31
5 Goldberg and Sons Wholesale 46.706 29 5 34
4 Wagon Ind. Holdings Vehicles 56.882 33 1 34
6 Initial Services Services 46.676 28 7 35
8 HEINZ (H J) CO Food 9.500 1 35 36
9 Coates Group Chemicals 45.353 27 10 37
11 Matthew Hall and Co Metal Goods 44.029 26 12 38
10 Telephone Rentals Transport 48.353 30 8 38
13 BTR Other Manufact. 40.618 24 20 44
15 Macmillan Bloedel Paper 29.676 13 36 49
19 JH Fenner & Co Engineering 52.353 32 22 54
20 Smith and Nephew Textiles 62.559 40 15 55
30 London Brick Brick 62.294 38 29 67
31 Yarrow & Co Shipbuilding 82.029 61 9 70
38 CARRERAS Tobacco 26.941 10 69 79
52 A Monk & Co. Construction 76.794 55 56 111
64 Hoover Electrical Eng. 83.147 63 70 133
82 May and Hassell Timber 120.147 131 24 155
89 Birmid Qualcast Metals 90.029 74 98 172
91 Allied Leather Industries Leather 98.912 88 85 173
198 Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons Paper 162.559 192 196 388
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The table shows the best performing company in each industry sector. Companies are 
ordered according to combined rank position. 
 
 
Sources: Calculated from CUDC data. 
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Discussion  
This research is exploratory and empirically driven. The discussion that follows is therefore a 
suggested research agenda and an attempt to draw only the most preliminary conclusions. 
Nonetheless, it is useful to consider explanations for success in selection of cases from Tables 
1 and 2. 
 The results from Tables 1 and 2 suggest that Ellis and Goldstein was Britain’s 
most successful company in financial terms between 1950-1983. A brief outline of its 
history suggests several potential insights into the workings of the corporate economy. 
Formed in 1910, Ellis & Goldstein (E&G) successfully operated in the womenswear 
sector (coats and costumes) of the textiles clothing industry that flourished in the East 
End of London. Although up to the 1930s the firm subcontracted a significant 
proportion of its manufacturing to ‘outdoor’ workers, increasingly this was brought 
into factories that E&G rented, albeit with subcontracting groups still being paid as if 
working ‘outdoors’. By the Second World War, they had three factories working on 
this basis, as well as a number of workshops, all of which were kept operational in 
spite of rationing, the Blitz and shortages. After the War, they decided to diversify 
into lighter clothing and separates, opening new factories in North Shields and in 
Kent, as well as a showroom in Well St, central London, marketing their brandnames 
such as Elgora, Elgee and Eastex. Their success, however, would appear to have been 
based on intimate links with major retailers that kept the factories and workshops 
extremely busy. The most important of these initially were C&A, Selfridges, and D.H. 
Evans, while by the 1970s the links had been extended to the highly influential Marks 
& Spencer, Next and British Home Stores. Once the Laura Lee brandname had been 
added to the range in the 1950s, E&G established a wide reputation for its 
womenswear that acted as the basis of its commercial success. Some acquisitions 
were made in the 1950s (Bent & Son Ltd), funded almost entirely from reserves, 
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while further factory extensions were made in 1965 (in Stockton-on-Tees), the keys to 
success would consequently have been effective control over design and production, 
successful marketing through established brandnames, and working closely with 
major retailers to ensure a reliable supply of orders. By the 1980s, E&G had also 
opened its own leisurewear shopping chain, Dash. They also had to adapt their 
product range (to include by the 1970s coats, suits, dresses, skirts, slacks, knitwear 
and sportswear).to major fashion changes, given that womenswear was extremely 
vulnerable to these pressures.17 
As the above review suggests, Ellis and Goldstein was built on strong, tightly 
focused brands. The ‘Eastex’ and ‘Dash Leisurewear’ brands allowed the company to 
build reputation for quality. Selling to niche markets, these offered profile but low 
vulnerability to rent rises. However, strong brands made the company attractive to 
predators and the company was taken over by Alexon in 1988. After the take-over, 
Alexon management over-extended the Dash brand by opening too many shops in 
high rental locations. Eastex, meanwhile, remained ‘the jewel in the crown’ with ‘the 
most amazing customer allegiance, probably because there is no direct competition’.18 
Thus, brand-based strategies offered potentially profitable alternatives to growth 
orientation and cost leadership through economies of scale.  
Another overall top 20 company, Smith and Nephew, also based its strategy 
on a niche within the textile industry, in this case bandages and specialist industrial 
clothing. At the beginning of the period the company was predominantly a health care 
business and integrated backwards into textiles to secure supplies for the production 
of specialist medical, surgical and sanitary textiles. Such integration predated the 
rationalisation of the textile industry by of the 1960s, thereby allowing S&N to buy up 
businesses cheaply, such as Brierfield Mills, install up to date equipment, and secure 
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economies of scale through continued capital investment.19 During the 1960s the 
company controlled wage costs by setting up production facilities via its 
‘commonwealth development plan’ in countries such as New Zealand and South 
Africa.20 Throughout the 1960s and 1970s the company benefited from the expansion 
of the National Health Service and simultaneously expanded its brand profile. Some 
mistakes were made, for example the expansion into beauty and cosmetics via the 
acquisition of Gala and the relatively poor performance of brands such as Mary Quant 
and Miners. Even so, the core brands such as Elastoplast and Nivea, recorded steady 
progress, representing the core portfolio of a well-focused business. The company 
benefited from good City connections notwithstanding its original regional base and 
developed incentive plans to align managerial and investor interests from the mid 
1960s.21 
Thomson, positioned 16th overall (table 1), owed its success to the 
entrepreneurial control of Roy Thomson. His strategy was expansion of the firm’s 
base of the Sunday Times (including The Times from 1967) newspaper through 
integration of other regional, trade and technical newspapers and related 
diversification into new media such as commercial television. He used financial 
control to manage the growth of the business effectively overseeing a number of 
acquisitions that enhanced the cash generation potential of the business, and 
commented ‘I would sooner take a balance sheet home to read than a book’.22 
Thomson’s string of successful acquisitions boosted profits to record level in 1964.23 
Meanwhile he improved production efficiency and market appeal by investment in a 
new plant away from Fleet Street using young non-union labour adopting US style 
multi-coloured web offset litho printing processes and computerised typesetting.24 
Such investments gave Thomson an advantage that would take the rest of Fleet Street 
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20 years to realise. Meanwhile from 1965 the firm began a strategy of expansion into 
educational services and publishing through new acquisitions underpinned the 
organisation’s ambition to serve the broader social and economic life of the nation.25 
From Thomson’s point of view the downside of the acquisition strategy was that it 
also acquired unionised workers, notably at The Times and the company was 
increasingly embroiled in industrial disputes in the 1970s, culminating in a prolonged 
stoppage at Times Newspapers in 1980 and the subsequent sale of the division. 
Although profitability was damaged in publishing interests, the diversification 
strategy yielded counter-balancing profit opportunities particularly in travel and North 
Sea oil exploration.26 Success associated with continued acquisitions in these areas 
helped maintain Thomson’s strong profitability record into the 1980s 
Focusing on the design, engineering and manufacture of vehicle body 
structures for the European automotive industry, Wagon Industrial Holdings has 
expanded significantly from its initial base of railway freight wagon repair through a 
process of diversification, acquisition and international expansion. Formed in 1918 by 
a group of railway freight wagon manufacturers, what was until 1974 known as 
Wagon Repairs Ltd prospered as a result of abundant orders from its creators. It went 
public in 1936, at which point several other wagon repair and manufacturing 
businesses were absorbed into a larger operation based in Birmingham. As a result of 
railway nationalisation in 1946, their business declined, prompting management to 
initiate a diversification strategy that saw them move into office furniture and retail 
storage through the acquisition of Handy Angle Co in 1951. By 1979, the railways 
repairs business had been sold, with the funds invested in the development of 
automotive components manufacturing. In 1980, they also purchased the French 
company Vinco, to boost its office furniture business. By 1988-89, WIH had also 
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acquired several French, Spanish and German precision engineering firms to bolster 
further its successful automotive components business. It was a story of adaptation, 
diversification and acquisitions that ensured WIH would continue to generate solid 
returns.27 
Although originally a New Zealand-based firm specialising in dried milk, by 
the 1920s what had been known as Joseph Nathan & Co. became better known by its 
brand-name, Glaxo. It was also during this period that the firm diversified into 
vitamins and related areas, while by 1935 they had opened a laboratory to investigate 
proprietary pharmaceuticals. As a result of disagreements between the London and 
Wellington branches of the Nathan family, the former asserted greater control, 
resulting in the creation of Glaxo Laboratories Ltd in 1935 as the base for the new 
pharmaceutical businesses under a bright young chemist, Harry Jephcott. Using a 
combination of extensive internal research and development programmes and 
acquiring licences from American firms for promising new drugs, Glaxo prospered 
during and after the Second World War, building a range of products that were highly 
regarded. Jephcott, however, was well aware of the overwhelming competitive 
pressures from much larger American pharmaceutical firms, prompting him to acquire 
one of Glaxo’s major British competitors, Allen Hanbury, in 1958, and Evans 
Medical Ltd in 1960. In 1971, Glaxo also attempted to purchase Beecham’s, one of 
the UK’s leading pharmaceutical firms, but this was blocked by the government. Size 
alone, on the other hand, was no defence against competitors; the key was developing 
commercially-viable drugs that would sell globally, a strategy that Glaxo pursued 
relentlessly throughout the post-war era, but especially under Alan Wilson as 
chairman from 1963 and Paul Girolami as finance director from 1968. This was 
complemented by building a more robust marketing organisation, as well as the 
 15
construction of manufacturing plants in France and Germany, reflecting the switch 
from the Commonwealth to Europe as the mainstay of Glaxo’s sales. This was 
followed in 1978 by the acquisition of Meyer Laboratories, a small American 
pharmaceutical firm that provided Glaxo with an entrée into the enormous US market. 
The key to Glaxo’s success, however, was the production of highly successful drugs 
such as Zantac, an anti-ulcerent, which was launched in 1981, which placed the firm 
second behind Merck in terms of global sales, with substantial income emanating 
from the US market. The keys to success would consequently appear to have been 
significant investments in R&D, robust marketing and acquisitions and investments in 
Europe and the USA.28 
Founded in 1929 by market trader Sir Edward John Cohen Tesco has 
experienced phenomenal success in the UK overtaking Sainsbury’s as the UK’s 
largest supermarket in 1995 and controlling an estimated 12.5 % of the total retail 
market in the UK by 2004. Having developed a strong UK core business, Tesco 
rapidly expanded overseas from the mid 1990s onwards, favouring a strategy of 
acquisition predominantly in Asia and Eastern Europe. 
Inspired by the American model of the supermarket, Cohen opened the UK’s 
first self-service grocery shop in St Albans in 1948. During the 1960s Tesco expanded 
across the UK through the acquisition of small grocery businesses, at the same time 
diversifying into the non-food sector with its Home’n’Wear range.    Following a deal 
with Esso, Tesco began to open petrol stations alongside its superstores from 1974 
onwards.  However, the ‘pile it high, sell it cheap’ strategy adopted by Cohen was no 
longer fashionable among a more discerning public.  In an effort to shed its ‘cheap’ 
image, Tesco closed a number of unprofitable stores, modernised others and 
throughout the 1980s focused on developing large, out-of-town stores selling a range 
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of food and non-food items.   This strategy was reversed to some extent in the 1990s, 
as planning permission for large stores became less easy to obtain.Alternatively, 
Tesco Metro and Tesco Express stores were introduced in high streets and city 
centres, while large Tesco Extra stores stocked a growing  number of non-food items 
including the American ‘Cherokee’ clothing range, electrical goods, books, 
newspapers and CDs. It was during this period that Tesco began to expand 
internationally, purchasing the Lotus chain in Thailand in 1998 and acquiring a 
number of hypermarkets in Poland from the German-based company HIT.   Following 
a deal with the Royal Bank of Scotland in 1997, Tesco began to diversify into 
financial services, becoming one of the fastest growing providers of personal financial 
services in Europe by 2003. The extraordinary success of Tesco would appear to have 
been achieved through a process of diversification into different sectors, formats and 
markets while maintaining a focus on its core UK business which continues to 
generate around 80% of the group’s profits. 29   
As Tables 1 and 2 suggest, when profitability is the criterion of success, smaller firms 
tend to perform well. Other surveys within the time frame of the current study have suggested 
an inverse relationship between size and profitability.30 Nonetheless in a long-run study it 
might be expected that this would not necessarily be the case. If quoted companies post high 
profits, capital would be attracted to those companies, offering management the option of 
growth backed by cheap funds. Why then did the management of Ellis and Goldstein and 
similar companies not turn their consistently high profits into growth opportunities? The 
answer undoubtedly lies in the system of corporate governance. Management may have been 
prevented from growing the firm by limitations of demand in core markets. While 
diversification may have been possible in these circumstances, this would be penalised by an 
efficient capital market. Under such constraints, management would have little choice but to 
pay their profits to shareholders as dividends. Alternatively, if demand in core markets was 
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not restricted or the capital market was inefficient, management may nonetheless have faced 
pressure for high dividends, notwithstanding the profitability of available investment 
opportunities. Either way, especially in the light of the accusations of short-termism levelled 
at the British financial system, the issue of dividend policies requires further research. 
Chandler has argued that the family capitalists who controlled British industry tended 
to view their businesses as estates that generated income for dividends. Ever since publication 
of Scale and Scope, the dominant issues in business history on both sides of the Atlantic have 
been concerned with business size and the ways in which managerial hierarchies evolved to 
solve the problems posed by growing scale and complexity of modern business 
organisation.31  Indeed, as far as comparative analyses are concerned, it has been the speed 
with which Britain sought to emulate the American lead which is thought to have been central 
to the different economic successes of the manufacturing sectors in these two economies until 
the eve of the Second World War. Apart from one or two notable exceptions such as ICI, 
Unilever and British Petroleum, Chandler’s overall assessment of British manufacturing is 
damning: 
 
‘The general failure to develop organisational capabilities weakened British industry 
and with it the British economy…the failure to consolidate industry-wide federations 
into modern industrial enterprises…meant the lack of effective enterprises to 
rationalise industries by investing in state of the art facilities and developing the skills 
essential to exploit the economies of scale and scope…the failure to develop 
competitive abilities resulted in high economic and social costs in terms of rate of 
return on investment and of employment.  On the whole British industries benefited 
far less from technological innovation than those of the United States and Germany in 
the years before World War II’.16 
 
Fundamentally, the reason why Britain failed was because the bulk of her manufacturing 
firms failed to make the necessary ‘three-pronged’ investments in production, distribution, 
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and management.32 Of course, as Chandler himself noted, the need and the incentive to make 
these investments varied across industries and between sectors of the economy.33 Crucially, 
however, because these investments are thought central to the emergence of the biggest 
manufacturing firms, Chandler limits his analysis to the two hundred biggest firms in the 
USA, Great Britain and Germany. Such companies were located in the ‘core’ industries of 
these economies from the later nineteenth century until the 1940s. 
There are a number of perspectives by which the growth of large firms in these 
industries can be considered successful.  Firstly, by definition, the biggest companies were 
necessarily the most successful in overcoming the problems posed by growing scale and 
complexity of manufacturing and distribution facilities.  Secondly, because manufacturing 
was by far the biggest sector in these economies [not sure about this, as Services well over 
50% of GDP by 1960s; key issue is high level of concentration in manufacturing sector – see 
Hannah, who says that by 1970s CR100=42%] during the period in question,34 it follows that 
the biggest two hundred companies in manufacturing had a disproportionate influence on the 
economy as a whole.  Finally, of course, growing aggregate concentration (as distinct from 
market concentration) has meant that the significance of the biggest companies has grown 
through time. However, we are concerned to show that over-reliance on the dominant 
paradigm may be misleading when alternative measures of corporate success and alternative 
time periods are considered. Our justification for advancing this perspective is two-fold.  
Firstly, it does not follow that the biggest companies (and, by definition, those most 
successful at making the ‘three-pronged’ investment) were also the most profitable.  
Secondly, while concentration on the manufacturing sector has considerable merit in the pre-
1945 period, in the post-1945 period, de-industrialisation, especially pronounced in the UK, 
has meant the manufacturing sector has become less important.  Each of these points is 
developed below. 
Bearing these considerations in mind, it is interesting to speculate on the potential 
impact of profitability analysis on the major paradigms in Business History. Chandler’s 
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framework as outlined above is the obvious place to begin.35 Two propositions are worth 
exploring: 
 
P1:  Chandler’s paradigm requires fundamental revision due to the fixation with size and the 
failure to consider profitability. 
 
P2: Chandler’s paradigm is broadly correct, but requires modification to incorporate 
profitability and its cash flow consequences within his comparative framework.  
 
For P1 to be true, it would have to be accepted that profitability is a sufficient yardstick for 
international corporate competitiveness. The objection to this view is that profitability reflects 
country-specific conditions, for example local entry barriers or monopolies that may do 
nothing to enhance international competitiveness. On the other hand, the creation of such 
barriers, for example niche marketing in response to import penetration, represents a sensible 
yardstick for entrepreneurial activity. A further objection is that profitability may be a barrier 
to growth through the iterative relationship between firms and capital providers. Higher 
profits suggest success, but also raise the opportunity cost for further investment, particularly 
where profits are a function of risk rather than monopoly. The higher cost of capital in the UK 
relative to international competitor economies has been cited as a reason for its relative 
inefficiency.36 
This argument takes the discussion beyond the scope of the Chandler paradigm, but it 
is perhaps suggestive of the revisionist approach of P2. Capital markets play a crucial role in 
the allocation of capital in a modern economy. In theory at least, profitability signals to 
investors the desirability of capital allocation across firms and industries. However, it is 
necessary that these processes are carried out efficiently. Very little research has been carried 
out in this area, although one survey has shown that for the cotton industry in the 1950s and 
1960s there were considerable allocative inefficiencies.37 Moreover, government fiscal policy 
can have distorting effects. More importantly, if an economy or sector demonstrates the 
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features of Chandler’s ‘Family Capitalism’, it is unlikely that the capital market will 
demonstrate efficient attributes. Family members cannot discipline management by exiting 
their investments without diluting their controlling shareholdings. They may also lack the 
ability to control managers at general meetings through want of technical and financial 
expertise, especially where block holdings are passed from one generation to the next. At the 
same time, passivity and the presence of family block holdings creates an illiquid market for 
shares. In these circumstances shareholders can only generate income from their investments 
by demanding dividends. Thus, companies can be profitable but at the same time prevented 
by their governance structures from making investments in scale and scope economies.38 This 
view is consistent with, but not fully explored by, the dominant paradigm.    
As far as profitability is concerned, the defenders are remarkably quiet. So too are 
others who have developed and applied Chandler’s analysis of corporate capitalism in the 
context of British institutions after 1950.39 We find this surprising on a number of grounds.  
Although these authors are aware of the importance of the profit motive to the creators of big 
business,40 nowhere do they establish precisely how exploitation of economies of scale and 
scope benefited the profitability of big firms. Nor, indeed, does he undertake a comparative 
analysis comparing the profitability of firms undertaking the ‘three pronged investment’ with 
those that did not. Previous work by the authors has shown that firms making the three-
pronged investment did not necessarily achieve superior profitability.41 
The failure to explore the issue of profitability further is all the more surprising 
because a wealth of literature is available on the structure-performance relationship, which 
was the dominant paradigm in industrial economics for many years. Given the emphasis 
placed upon company size and the first-mover advantages available to firms which most 
eagerly sought to exploit economies of scale, it seems odd that a potentially important 
indicator of the presence of these economies, ROCE is not employed to provide more 
empirical support for the arguments made. 
Our second major concern, and one that justifies the search for alternative 
methodologies in business history, relies on the observation that in the post-1945 period, the 
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importance of manufacturing in the economy has become less important.  Of course, to be fair 
to Chandler, concentration on the pre-1945 period, necessarily requires focus upon the 
manufacturing sector and, almost by definition, therefore, concentration upon the biggest 
manufacturing firms.  However, in the post-1945 period, de-industrialisation has reduced the 
importance of the manufacturing sector.  By implication, therefore, it is less likely that the 
biggest firms in manufacturing will also be the biggest firms in the economy.  In the light of 
these considerations it appears that the relevance of Chandler’s paradigm is highly dependent 
upon a particular time period. 
Recognition of this was central to the arguments of Piore and Sabel who suggested 
that economic conditions from the early 1970s were completely inauspicious to 
manufacturing activities which were built upon the classic Chandlerian lines of high-volume 
production, massive scale economies, and fully-integrated production-distribution 
operations.42  According to Piore and Sable, an entirely different philosophy was required in 
manufacturing: one that espoused small-scale operations, flexibility, the use of low, asset-
specific technology, and very much lower levels of vertical integration.   Building upon their 
work, the term ‘flexible specialisation’ has come into increasing usage to refer to 
manufacturing operations that are distinctly non-Chandlerian in character. These structures 
are also supportive of family-based forms of business organisation in certain industries.43 
Tables 1 and 2 above and Appendix 1 showing the 182 most profitable UK 
companies between 1950-1983 provide some support for a modification of the Chandlerian 
framework.  While it is true that some of these companies do fit neatly into the Chandlerian 
paradigm – for example, Glaxo, Dunlop, BOC, Goodyear, GKN – it is nonetheless the case 
that such companies are the exception rather than the rule.  Many of the most profitable 
companies would be either too small to obtain a ranking in the UK’s top 200 companies by 
size or they are in sectors such as clothing and footwear, wholesale, paper, and services which 
have tended to be specifically ignored in standard Chandlerian analyses. These points receive 
some elaboration in the conclusion. 
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Conclusions 
This paper presents our preliminary researches into the ranking of the UK’s most enduringly 
profitable companies throughout the period 1950-1983.  It should be clear from this paper that 
our chosen measure of performance, ROCE, is a measure of outcomes, of the success or 
otherwise of the strategies pursued by the management running the companies in our sample. 
The processes associated with achieving these outcomes have only been tentatively addressed 
and await further research. At this stage, therefore, it is necessary to be cautious about 
reaching conclusions. Nonetheless, on the basis of the evidence presented here we believe it is 
reasonable for a few general points to be made. 
Firstly, and unlike Chandler, we are not yet at a stage where we can provide a 
substantive business history of the companies in our sample.  Nonetheless, as we indicated 
earlier, it is already apparent that small companies (those not in the top 200 by size) are 
among the most profitable – and therefore successful – in recent history.  This suggests that 
the importance of economies of scale and scope and their implications for competitiveness 
need to be re-assessed. Alternative business strategies appear to have been equally successful. 
Secondly, it may be recalled that Chandler is particularly damning in his verdict on family 
firms. Such firms, according to Chandler, were both unwilling and incapable of making the 
three-pronged investments in production, distribution and personnel because this would have 
diminished family control of the business. Our research paints a different picture.  To the 
extent that some of the most profitable companies in our sample were also relatively small, it 
follows that there was necessarily a greater role for family involvement in the business than 
would have been the case if such firms had been bigger. In other words, smaller firm 
strategies, at least in the post-1945 period, offered alternative routes to profitability. A final 
point is that nowhere in this paper have we attempted test Chandler’s hypotheses on the 
desirability of firms making the ‘three-pronged’ investment.  In the light of our previous 
comments, and the evidence presented in this paper, we hope it is apparent that we do not 
believe such tests are necessary. One reason is that many of the companies in our sample are 
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completely unsuited to analysis along Chandlerian lines – so such tests would be 
inappropriate, to say the least.  
The research agenda sketched above suggests the issue of governance, especially 
regarding the impact of family block shareholdings and associated capital market 
inefficiencies, requires detailed analysis. This will form part of a major research agenda 
arising from the results presented in this paper. In the meantime, we hope the evidence 
presented above provides sufficient justification for our belief that there is a need to use 
alternative measures of business success and, therefore, the need to develop alternative 
paradigms of the business strategies which lead to that success. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Britain’s Best Performing Companies, 1950-83: Full Sample Listing 
 
Position Company Industry 
Rank 
Score 
Rank 
Rank 
ER 
Rank 
Comb 
Rank 
1 Ellis & Goldstein Clothing & Footwear 36.382 18 6 24
2 Grattan Warehouses Retail 42.941 25 4 29
3 WOLVERHAMPTON & DUDLEY Drinks 16.324 3 28 31
4 Wagon Ind. Holdings Vehicles 56.882 33 1 34
5 Goldberg and Sons Wholesale 46.706 29 5 34
6 Initial Services Services 46.676 28 7 35
7 Dowty Vehicles 57.206 34 2 36
8 HEINZ (H J) CO Food 9.500 1 35 36
9 Coates Group Chemicals 45.353 27 10 37
10 Telephone Rentals Transport 48.353 30 8 38
11 Matthew Hall and Co Metal Goods 44.029 26 12 38
12 Glaxo Chemicals 49.618 31 11 42
13 BTR Other Manufacturing 40.618 24 20 44
14 BASSETT (GEO) HOLDINGS Food 20.765 6 40 46
15 Macmillan Bloedel Containers Paper 29.676 13 36 49
16 Thomson Organisation Paper 64.559 47 3 50
17 FH Tomkins Metal Goods 61.559 37 13 50
18 Tesco Retail 62.412 39 14 53
19 JH Fenner & Co Engineering 52.353 32 22 54
20 Smith and Nephew Textiles 62.559 40 15 55
21 MAYNARDS Food 15.000 2 54 56
22 Currys Retail 63.441 42 17 59
23 CADBURY SCHWEPPES Drinks 21.118 7 52 59
24 Nottingham Manufacturing Co Textiles 64.206 45 16 61
25 Gestetner Holdings Engineering 58.029 35 26 61
26 Marks and Spencer Retail 63.735 44 18 62
27 Concentric Metal Goods 60.206 36 27 63
28 THWAITES (DANIEL) & CO Drinks 22.441 8 58 66
29 UNITED BISCUITS (HOLDING Food 17.824 4 62 66
30 London Brick Brick 62.294 38 29 67
31 Yarrow & Co Shipbuilding 82.029 61 9 70
32 Beecham Group Chemicals 62.794 41 31 72
33 Glynwed Metal Goods 63.618 43 30 73
34 British Home Stores Retail 73.853 53 21 74
35 Granada Group Services 77.471 56 19 75
36 GUS Retail 71.382 50 25 75
37 Coalite Chemicals 64.382 46 32 78
38 CARRERAS Tobacco 26.941 10 69 79
39 Automotive Products Vehicles 78.088 58 23 81
40 Corah Textiles 75.382 54 33 87
41 SCOTTISH & NEWCASTLE Drinks 29.294 12 75 87
42 Associated Book Publishers Paper 31.412 15 73 88
43 Armstrong Equipment Engineering 70.853 49 41 90
44 DAVENPORTS BREWERY Drinks 30.882 14 80 94
45 Boots Chemicals 73.647 52 44 96
46 Bulmer and Lumb Holdings Textiles 85.500 65 34 99
47 Bestobell Engineering 72.500 51 50 101
48 Pegler Hattersley Metal Goods 77.588 57 46 103
49 VAUX & ASSOC. BREWERIES Drinks 32.147 16 90 106
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50 BASS  Drinks 32.206 17 92 109
51 Redland Brick 79.618 60 51 111
52 A Monk & Co. Construction 76.794 55 56 111
53 TATE & LYLE Food 25.971 9 102 111
54 Foster Bros Retail 90.559 75 37 112
55 Donald McPherson Group Chemicals 82.294 62 53 115
56 Highams Textiles 89.529 71 45 116
57 Thomas Locker Holdings Metal Goods 89.176 69 48 117
58 ROWNTREE MACKINTOSH Food 27.471 11 111 122
59 Westland Aircraft Vehicles 98.029 85 38 123
60 H Samuel Retail 94.765 81 42 123
61 BPB Industries Brick 86.559 66 57 123
62 Hopkinsons Holdings Engineering 87.118 67 59 126
63 SW Berisford Wholesale 93.382 78 49 127
64 Hoover Electrical Eng. 83.147 63 70 133
65 Expanded Metal Co Metal Goods 89.471 70 64 134
66 Parkland Textile Holdings Textiles 93.971 80 55 135
67 IMPERIAL TOBACCO GROUP Tobacco 36.765 19 116 135
68 Marley Brick 89.912 73 63 136
69 News of the World Organisation Paper 66.882 48 89 137
70 Aberdeen Construction Construction 89.706 72 66 138
71 WHITBREAD & CO Drinks 38.294 20 119 139
72 W. Canning &Co Electrical Eng. 78.618 59 82 141
73 Portals Holdings Paper 91.500 76 67 143
74 Reed International Paper 19.353 5 138 143
75 Trust House Forte Services 95.618 83 61 144
76 Tarmac Brick 93.882 79 65 144
77 Thorn Electrical Industries Electrical Eng. 88.912 68 76 144
78 Laird Group Shipbuilding 109.265 108 39 147
79 Asprey & Co Retail 105.029 101 47 148
80 AAH Wholesale 99.118 89 60 149
81 Culter Guardbridge Holdings Paper 85.118 64 88 152
82 May and Hassell Timber 120.147 131 24 155
83 Whessoe Engineering 96.265 84 71 155
84 Law and Bonar Textiles 100.882 92 68 160
85 Steetley Brick 98.441 87 79 166
86 Barr and Wallace Arnold Trust Transport 101.059 94 74 168
87 Turner and Newall Textiles 104.206 98 72 170
88 GN Haden & Sons Construction 100.853 91 81 172
89 Birmid Qualcast Metals 90.029 74 98 172
90 CAVENHAM FOODS Food 38.500 21 151 172
91 Allied Leather Industries Leather 98.912 88 85 173
92 Smiths Industries Metal Goods 104.500 100 77 177
93 Mitchell Somers Engineering 102.529 95 83 178
94 Chubb Metal Goods 104.029 97 86 183
95 Delta Metal Co Metals 98.206 86 97 183
96 Bowater Paper Corp Paper 39.500 22 161 183
97 RANKS HOVIS MCDOUGALL Food 39.941 23 162 185
98 Unilever Chemicals 105.559 102 84 186
99 Yorkshire Chemicals Chemicals 104.324 99 87 186
100 Cope Allman & Co Metals 95.500 82 104 186
101 Sears Holdings Clothing & Footwear 108.235 104 91 195
102 John Brown and Co Shipbuilding 108.265 105 93 198
103 Weir Group Engineering 108.618 106 95 201
 26
104 W Tyzack and Sons and Turner Metal Goods 136.059 160 43 203
105 S Radcliffe (Greatbridge) Metals 101.029 93 113 206
106 Manders Holdings Chemicals 109.412 109 99 208
107 Boosey and Hawkes Metal Goods 108.824 107 101 208
108 Danish Bacon Co Wholesale 115.912 122 100 222
109 Associated Engineering Engineering 114.206 119 105 224
110 Deritend Stamping Co Metal Goods 114.176 118 109 227
111 Plessey Electrical Eng. 112.265 115 112 227
112 Sidlaw Industries Textiles 118.647 127 103 230
113 Associated Hotels Services 117.412 124 107 231
114 Valor Metal Goods 111.265 113 118 231
115 Arthur Lee and Sons Metals 106.853 103 130 233
116 Fitch Lovell Wholesale 127.294 141 94 235
117 Wilmot Breeden Holdings Vehicles 118.000 125 110 235
118 Steinberg & Sons Clothing & Footwear 114.353 120 115 235
119 W&C French Construction 92.941 77 158 235
120 Ruberoid Brick 120.118 130 106 236
121 Chloride Electrical Storage Co. Electrical Eng. 111.441 114 123 237
122 John Foster and Son Textiles 120.765 132 108 240
123 Neepsend Steel and Tool  Metals 102.765 96 144 240
124 FH Lloyd & Co Metals 110.529 110 137 247
125 WH Smith Retail 132.353 153 96 249
126 Manganese Bronze Holdings Metals 114.853 121 132 253
127 Ransom and Marles Bearing Co Engineering 121.853 134 120 254
128 J Lucas Industries Electrical Eng. 118.500 126 128 254
129 De La Rue Paper 147.941 178 78 256
130 Bridport Gundry Textiles 127.235 140 117 257
131 Carpets International Textiles 114.118 117 140 257
132 Metal Box Co Metal Goods 124.382 136 122 258
133 Westminster & Country Properties Services 123.706 135 124 259
134 National Sunlight Laundries Services 130.118 146 114 260
135 Rotary Hoes Engineering 110.882 111 150 261
136 Taylor Woodrow Construction 126.147 138 125 263
137 Barrow Hepburn Group Leather 125.559 137 126 263
138 Ferranti Electrical Eng. 120.941 133 131 264
139 Bath and Portland Group Brick 127.206 139 129 268
140 Manc Guardian & Evening News Paper 100.176 90 181 271
141 Johnson Matthey Metal Goods 119.147 129 145 274
142 Avon Rubber Other Manufacturing 111.118 112 164 276
143 Blue Circle Brick 129.500 144 133 277
144 Richard Johnson and Nephew Metal Goods 128.471 143 134 277
145 Henlys Retail 127.529 142 143 285
146 Rugby Portland Cement Brick 131.059 150 136 286
147 Richardsons Westgarth & Co Shipbuilding 113.647 116 176 292
148 Associated Paper Mills Paper 130.176 147 146 293
149 WGI Engineering 130.529 148 149 297
150 Dunlop Other Manufacturing 116.853 123 174 297
151 BOC Chemicals 134.412 156 142 298
152 Francis Industries Metal Goods 135.029 158 141 299
153 House of Fraser Retail 148.324 179 121 300
154 George Cohen 600 Group Wholesale 138.235 166 135 301
155 Baker Perkins Holdings Engineering 135.676 159 148 307
156 Kenning Motor Group Retail 151.618 182 127 309
157 BICC Electrical Eng. 134.559 157 152 309
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158 GEC Electrical Eng. 133.382 155 154 309
159 Mowlem Construction 136.971 163 147 310
160 George Spencer Textiles 130.588 149 169 318
161 English calico Textiles 137.882 164 155 319
162 Cookson (Lead Industries) Chemicals 140.265 167 153 320
163 Goodyear Tyre and Rubber Co. Other Manufacturing 118.676 128 193 321
164 Tozer Kemsley and Millbourn Wholesale 131.794 151 172 323
165 GKN Metal Goods 143.324 171 156 327
166 Savoy Hotel Services 142.412 168 159 327
167 Renold Engineering 138.147 165 163 328
168 Davy Ashmore Engineering 136.088 161 168 329
169 United Newspapers Paper 165.588 193 139 332
170 Whitecroft Textiles 145.941 175 157 332
171 Vauxhall Motors Vehicles 132.000 152 180 332
172 Babcock and Wilcox Engineering 146.941 176 160 336
173 Selincourt Clothing & Footwear 133.118 154 187 341
174 Illingworth Morris Textiles 147.559 177 167 344
175 Duport Timber 129.824 145 199 344
176 ICI Chemicals 153.853 183 165 348
177 Tube Investments Metals 144.118 173 177 350
178 Rank Organisation Services 145.559 174 179 353
179 Berry Wiggins Chemicals 136.588 162 194 356
180 British Ropes (Bridon) Metal Goods 156.912 187 170 357
181 Staveley Industries Metals 143.529 172 186 358
182 Powell Duffryn Wholesale 158.912 190 171 361
183 Owen and Owen Retail 170.559 196 166 362
184 Fisons Chemicals 157.559 189 175 364
185 Union International Transport 150.294 181 183 364
186 International Computers Holdings Engineering 142.853 169 195 364
187 Laporte Chemicals 149.941 180 185 365
188 Brookhouse, J. and Co Metal Goods 157.559 188 178 366
189 British Electric Traction Transport 155.529 184 184 368
190 Uniroyal Other Manufacturing 142.941 170 198 368
191 Austin Reed Group Retail 172.794 197 173 370
192 William Baird Brick 155.529 185 189 374
193 Lister & Co Textiles 156.382 186 190 376
194 Debenhams Retail 177.118 198 182 380
195 Burton Group Clothing & Footwear 167.206 195 191 386
196 Vickers Engineering 166.353 194 192 386
197 John Lewis and Co Retail 179.088 199 188 387
198 Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons Paper 162.559 192 196 388
199 Heywood Williams Group Metal Goods 161.059 191 197 388
200 Chrysler UK Vehicles 179.529 200 200 400
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